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Modifying Merger Consent Decrees to
Improve Merger Enforcement Policy
BY STEVEN C. SALOP

T

H I S A RT I C L E A N A LY Z E S M Y
shor t proposal for reviewing and modifying
merger consent decrees to permit additional
relief if the provisions of the initial consent
merger are found to fail to preserve or restore
competition in a reasonable period of time after the merger
was consummated.1 My proposal also would involve more
frequent reviews of consummated mergers that have been
cleared without challenge, particularly those that were close
calls. While “Don’t Look Back” might be the best anthem for
artists, economic decision theory would not support that
approach to merger policy.2
Predicting the impact of proposed mergers and remedies
on consumers is difficult. As a result, remedies sometimes
turn out to be insufficient to protect consumers and competition. This review and modification process would help to
correct insufficient, poorly designed, or otherwise ineffective
consent decrees. It will place more of the risk of failure on the
merging parties who claim to the agency that the merger
would not harm competition and that the remedy is sufficient to cure the agency’s concerns. As a result, the merging
firms likely would be incentivized to provide more efficient
and effective remedies at the HSR stage, rather than bear the
risk of less efficient remedies, disgorgement and other relief
later. This allocation of risk to the merged firm also would
help to deter the post-merger exercise of market power
achieved or enhanced by the merger. For the same reasons, it
also would increase the deterrence of anticompetitive mergers. Finally, it also could reduce the moral hazard of overreaching argumentation by the merging parties and their
attorneys.
Review of consummated mergers is neither novel nor
new. While HSR has involved pre-merger notification for
the past 40 years, it did not eliminate the ability of the agencies to issue complaints against consummated mergers. The
agencies occasionally do bring enforcement actions for conSteven Salop is Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University
Law Center, and Senior Consultant, Charles River Associates. The views in
this article are the author’s and are not necessarily shared by his colleagues at Georgetown or CRA, or by any clients for whom he has provided economic consulting.

summated transactions after several years. Perhaps the most
notable recent example is the action brought in 2004 against
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare about four years after the
transaction closed without challenge.3 The FTC’s hospital
merger retrospectives studies apparently began sometime
after August 2002.4 There have also been cases where complaints were issued immediately after a merger was consummated, including Bazaarvoice,5 Heraeus Electro-Nite,6
and Chicago Bridge.7
While these matters involved transactions that previously
either were not notified or not challenged under HSR, postmerger review and modification provisions also should be
included as a matter of course for mergers that are challenged
and settled with consent decrees.8 Proposals for such postmerger reviews also are not new. In his 1998 article, Brian
Facey took a decision-theory approach in proposing postmerger review of efficiencies.9 He pointed out that Professor
Joseph Brodley made a proposal for post-merger reviews a
decade earlier.10 The FTC also contemplated a post-merger
review in the Lilly/PCS vertical merger. As described by FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky in a 1995 speech, the FTC’s statement said that “[i]f subsequent developments indicate anticompetitive effects, despite the presence of the negotiated
order, the Commission commits itself to seek other relief
including, if necessary, post-acquisition divestiture.” 11 Facey
also cited a Pennsylvania hospital case that contained a “put
up or shut up” consent decree requiring “efficiency shortfall
to be paid to the Attorney General’s office after 5-year trial
period.” 12
However, the type of consent decree review process outlined here has not become the norm.
The Goals and Benefits of the Review and
Modification Proposal
There are two general goals served by antitrust sanctions,
which can be called “ex ante” and “ex post” goals. The ex ante
goal is to deter initial conduct that would lead to the need for
ex post relief. If deterrence works perfectly, of course, there
will be no need for the ex post remedy. In cases where deterrence fails, the ex post goal is to prevent future harms.
Interestingly, ex post remedial inefficiency that can arise from
delaying relief is a two-edged sword. A higher cost ex post
remedy actually can incentivize more efficient ex ante behavF A L L
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ior. Those extra costs should incentivize the merging firms to
avoid proposing ineffective remedies during the premerger
process or exercising market power caused by the merger. In
this way, the post-merger review and modification process
acts as a partial guarantee by the merging firms.
These two general goals suggest three specific benefits of
the review and modification proposal: (1) to remedy ineffective consent decrees in order to preserve and restore competition; (2) to facilitate the adoption of more effective remedies during the HSR process; and (3) to deter anticompetitive
mergers and the exercise of market power achieved from
mergers.
First, the review and modification process can provide an
important backstop process for divestitures that fail from (say)
bankruptcy of the divestee or unethical behavior by the divesting firm that does not violate the decree The well-known
bankruptcies in the Hertz/Dollar Thrifty13 and Albertsons/
Safeway14 divestitures are two recent examples.
Second, these reviews and potential modifications can
provide a backstop where the assumptions underlying the
relief in the initial consent decree turn out to have been
incorrect or where the relief turns out to be insufficient to
preserve competition and protect consumer welfare. Firms
already have the right to petition for relief from consent
decrees when conditions in the market have changed. This
proposal creates symmetry.
This backstop is needed, given the record of current merger policy. For example, John Kwoka has reported on his
research on merger retrospectives. In his 2013 article, his
database had 46 true mergers, for which 38 (83 percent) had
price increases averaging almost 10 percent, whereas the other
8 had average decreases averaging almost 5 percent, implying
significantly higher prices on balance.15 In his 2015 book,
Kwoka had a larger sample of transactions.16 Robert Skitol’s
review of Kwoka’s book highlighted and quoted the following highly “provocative” results:17
䡲 “At the product level, the average outcome for all 119
observations on postmerger prices is an increase of 4.3 percent . . . . More than 60 percent of product price changes
show increases, and those increases average nearly 9 percent. . . . Of all mergers that resulted in price increases, the
agencies acted in only 38 percent of cases, suggesting substantial under-enforcement. Incorrectly cleared mergers on
average resulted in price increases in excess of 10 percent.” 18
䡲 “For all cases in which the agencies challenged mergers, the
outcome was . . . an average price increase of 7.71 percent,
indicating incorrect determinations or ineffective remedies
to the mergers.” 19
䡲 “[D]ivestiture remedies are associated with price increases of 6.11 percent,” casting doubt on their adequacy.
“Conduct remedies result in price increases of 12.81 percent, suggesting that these are largely ineffective in
restraining postmerger price increases.” 20
䡲 While less frequently studied, “the nonprice effects of
mergers generally mirror the measured price effects. Anti1 6
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competitive price increases tend to be accompanied by
reductions in quantity, quality, and R&D.” 21
While these studies do not indicate that all mergers lead
to higher prices, they do indicate a weakness in merger
enforcement policy.22
These harms are not surprising in light of the agencies’
current apparently limited remedial goals. The goal of preserving competition is often considered to mean that a remedy (say, a divestiture) should be limited to just enough to
prevent harms from the merger, not to strictly benefit consumers, relative to the absence of the merger.23 With this
limited goal, consumers would be expected on average to
obtain zero net benefits from settled mergers.
Suppose that the parties instead reject the settlement
demand, in which case the transaction is abandoned or litigation ensues. If the transaction is abandoned or if the case
goes to court and the agency successfully secures a court
injunction, there would be neither benefits nor harms. But, if
the agency loses its challenge, and the decision is a false negative, then consumers are made worse off. Thus, if the agency’s
expectations were accurate, then overall consumer welfare
would be harmed on balance from the entire universe of challenged mergers. Consumers also would be harmed from mergers where the agency accepts a somewhat weaker divestiture
(i.e., accepting some consumer harm) in order to avoid the
greater possible harm from losing its challenge in court.
Third, the proposal also can have beneficial effects on the
incentives of the merging parties, both before and after the
merger. During the pre-merger process, the merging parties
and their attorneys might be deterred from over-claiming,
once they recognize that their claims about large efficiencies,
easy entry, big buyers, or other reasons for lack of potential
market power harms might be later reviewed and evaluated.
Their incentives to propose flawed remedies similarly would
be reduced, knowing that the remedial failure would lead to
further relief. The fact that future remedies may be more
costly could provide a further incentive to solve the problems
before the merger. After the merger is consummated, the
merged firm also may be deterred from exercising market
power gained from the merger out of fear that this conduct
will lead to demands for further relief. Finally, the proposal
might deter some anticompetitive mergers, in that the likely private benefits from such mergers would be reduced.
Finally, while this post-merger review and consent decree
modification process is designed to complement pre-merger
relief, in principle it might permit the agencies to demand
smaller divestitures or other relief in certain cases, knowing
that there can be further adjustments later, if needed.
Similarly, the prospect of subsequent reviews in principle
could allow the agencies to forgo challenging some very
“close-call” mergers that otherwise would be challenged, as
mentioned by Chairman Pitofsky.24 However, it is important
that this forbearance is applied only in the most limited circumstances, not as a significant change in merger enforcement policy. Replacing the current process of pre-merger

relief with one in which mergers routinely are permitted to
be consummated, subject only to subsequent enforcement
during a probationary period, would be a serious policy error.
Post-consummation reviews may be imperfect and remedial
choices will be more limited. In addition, it may be difficult
to compensate customers for the harms suffered during the
interim period. The “Pyrrhic victories” of the pre-HSR world
and the Evanston Northwestern consent decree make this
point crystal clear. While a full-fledged policy of disgorgement and Treasury payments (as discussed below) might generate deterrence, it is better to fix the merger in advance or
“just say no.”
The Basic Review and Modification Proposal
The review and modification proposal would make explicit
the performance goals currently implicit in any consent
decree. Currently, DOJ consent decrees contain general language regarding potential modification by the court, and the
Commission has the right to reopen and modify FTC
orders.25 However, the court often will treat the provisions of
a consent decree as contractual and limiting, and will not permit modification if those provisions fail to achieve some
overarching goal of maintaining at least the same level of
competition as existed before the merger or would occur
absent the merger. Nor do consent decrees state this overarching goal. By making the performance goals and review
process explicit, the proposed policy will overcome the current limitations on modifying consent decrees.
Under the proposal, consent decrees would include explicit review and modification provisions that would give the
agency the power to petition the court to order further relief
if the consent decree fails to preserve competition and protect consumer welfare.26 While I will not suggest specific language here, the consent decree would specify that modification of the remedial conditions are permitted where the
purpose of the decree to preserve the degree of competition
that would occur absent the merger (or, restore and preserve
competition, in the case of judgments applied to consummated mergers) has not been achieved. It would be useful to
flag specific issues that might suggest a potential need for subsequent modification as well as general language about preserving competition. The types of harms might be flagged,
but merely as non-exclusive examples, so that the decree is
not overly limiting to the agency or the court. It also might
be useful for the provision to specify the burden of proof and
production. In this way, the relevant conditions would be
clear to the parties, and the voluntarily agreed-upon consent
decree provisions could be better enforced by a court. Similar
language might be used in closing statements for mergers that
are cleared without challenge.
The overarching purpose of the remedial modifications
would be to terminate the harm to competition, restore competitive conditions, and deprive the merged firm of the fruits
of an ineffective remedy. As discussed in more detail below,
the modifications could involve further divestitures or other

remedies. They also could include disgorgement of supracompetitive profits. Absent another effective remedy, they
might include monetary payments to the Treasury to disgorge
expected future supracompetitive profits caused by the merger or oversight of future prices.
A consent decree also should require the merged firm to
submit certain annual information to the agency to facilitate
potential review of the success of the decree in preserving
(and restoring) competition. This routinely provided information should not be excessive. For example, the agencies
obviously should not be provided an annual “refresh” to the
HSR second request. While more analysis of the data requirements needs to be undertaken, ordinary course data on prices,
margins, quantities, and market shares of the merged firm
and its competitors may well be sufficient, at least for an initial review. If the agency requires additional information for
a full-fledged review, the parties should have the right to
demand that the agency show the reasonableness of its
requests. The requirement for these disclosures should involve
a sunset provision. Merging firms should not be subject to
perpetual probation.
If the merging parties dispute the need for further relief,
the agency would need to defend its actions in court (or perhaps through an administrative hearing process in the case of
the FTC) in an expedited proceeding. The burden of persuasion to modify the decree would be placed on the agency,
but the burden should not be excessive. A burden of production would be placed on the parties because they have better access to certain information.
The Evanston Northwestern complaint was filed about four
years after the merger, though the review obviously began
before that date. This raises the question of the normal time
lag before carrying out the typical review. On the one hand,
a longer time frame means that more independent market
forces could be affecting competition, which would make it
more difficult to know whether the initial relief had failed or
whether other factors were responsible for the outcome. A
longer time frame also means that the remedy would be
delayed and the remedial alternatives may become narrowed.
On the other hand, it might take a significant period for the
market power harms to become clear. There is also the concern that the merged firm might hold down prices until the
review period has passed. Thus, the choice of time frame is
an issue for further analysis. One initial proposal might be for
the agencies typically to carry out the review within a 3–4
year period. It also seems reasonable to limit the agencies to
only a single review. However, this comes with a significant
caveat. If there is evidence that the merged firm subsequently raised prices as a result of market power flowing from or
enhanced by the merger, the period might be lengthened
somewhat or there might be a second review. The same caveat
would apply if the parties were found to have engaged in substantial misrepresentation.
Any judicial or administrative proceeding for modification
of a consent decree should be carried out on an expedited
F A L L
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basis, if possible. A longer delay may reduce the ability to craft
an efficient remedy and thus subject the firm to additional
disgorgement and/or damages from private litigation.
Alternative Remedial Modifications and
Relief Provisions
There are potential limitations involved in enforcement after
the consummation of the merger. In Evanston Northwestern,
the Commission did not follow the Administrative Law
Judge’s recommendation to require divestiture.27 It also did
not order disgorgement of the supracompetitive profits.28
Instead, it simply adopted a “highly unusual” remedy of
requiring the parties to engage in “independent negotiation.”
Unfortunately, this remedy seems impossible to monitor and
instead mainly appears to be window dressing.
This remedial failure raises the issue of whether the review
and modification proposal ever could lead to any real-world
market benefits. It can be difficult to unscramble the eggs.
However, analysis of the ex ante and ex post goals suggests
that there would be substantial benefits by restoring competition and increasing deterrence through alternative modifications.
The agency might ask the court to order one or more of
the following specific types of relief:
䡲 Divestitures: Divestitures are the standard remedy to preserve competition potentially lost from the merger. They
also would be the first remedy considered in the postmerger review and modification process. The efficacy of
divestitures would depend on the type of industry. While
it might be straightforward to divest some additional grocery stores, divestiture of a plant would be impossible if,
in the years following the transaction, the merged firm
replaced two pre-merger factories with a single, larger factory.
䡲 Other Structural and Behavioral Remedies: In the situation where divestitures are not possible or are highly inefficient, the modification remedy might involve licensing of
intellectual property rights, technology, or know-how at
zero or below-market rates. Customers may be given the
option to terminate existing contracts early in order to
reduce barriers to entry. If the merging firm faces a small
fraction of captive customers that have been targeted for
price increases while most other customers are more mobile
and obtain lower prices, then it might be feasible and efficient to mandate contractual constraints on price differentials. Or, it might be efficient to prohibit contractual or
unilateral restraints on resale by non-captive customers.29
䡲 Divestitures and Remedies in Other Markets: If divestitures or other remedies in the harmed market are not possible or are highly inefficient, the remedy might entail
divestitures or other remedies designed to increase competition in other markets in which the merged firm competes and has market power. It would be preferable for the
remedies to target other products purchased by the same
consumers harmed by the merger. While this involves
1 8
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some cross-market balancing that is not normally done for
mergers, the difference here is that the fear of such remedies could have beneficial deterrence effects on the merged
firm regardless of which group of consumers gain the
benefits.30
䡲 Disgorgement: While disgorgement of overcharges flowing
from supracompetitive prices does not eliminate market
power, the fear of disgorgement can deter its exercise.
Thus, if the merged firm fears that the agency would be
able to prove that the merger raised prices, relative to the
but-for world, that fear could deter post-merger price
increases. Fear of private treble damages actions might
have similar deterrence effects. If these penalties are not
certain, or if not all mergers are reviewed, the deterrence
benefits will be more limited, which suggests that the policy should be more aggressive when harm is detected. In
addition, the fact that the policy likely would involve a
single post-merger review conducted within a few years
after the merger is consummated raises a separate concern
that the fear of disgorgement might only deter price
increases during this interim period.
䡲 Payments to the Treasury: Suppose that the post-merger
review shows that the merger provided the firm with
durable market power that cannot be effectively remedied ex post. In that case, the agency might petition the
court to order the merged firm to make monetary payments to the Treasury to disgorge the net present value of
future profits accruing from the likely exercise of market
power caused by the merger. These payments would not
deter those future price increases, of course. However, the
anticipation of having to make such payments could deter
merging firms from undertaking the very conduct that
would lead to these payments being required.
䡲 Ongoing Oversight of Prices: Oversight of prices can be a
remedy of last resort as a substitute for the monetary payments to the Treasury. If deterrence fails and the agency
makes a dramatic error of clearing a merger that creates
durable monopoly power that cannot be otherwise remedied, society may be left with only two choices: (1) have
a court (or regulatory agency) monitor and regulate the
monopoly with the attendant imperfection of regulation;
or (2) force consumers and society to suffer the distributional and efficiency harms inherent in monopoly (albeit
while forcing the firm to disgorge the expected future
supracompetitive profits with payments to the Treasury).
While ongoing oversight of prices may create great discomfort for antitrust practitioners, commentators, and
the regulated firms, paying monopoly prices creates great
discomfort for consumers, who are entitled to protection
by the antitrust laws.
Potential Criticisms of the Proposal
There are several criticisms that might be levied against the
review and modification process. First, these post-merger
reviews would involve more work for the agencies and more

cost for the parties. While the costs likely would fall far short
of a full HSR second request, they would not be trivial in situations where market power harms appear to have occurred.
For this same reason, not all mergers would be reviewed in
detail and detection of remedial failure would necessarily be
imperfect. However, this does not seem to be a good policy
reason to abandon the proposal. The bang-per-buck in terms
of market correction and deterrence likely would be high.
Second, the available remedies available after the eggs
have been scrambled may be more limited than those that
could have been mandated in advance. However, as already
discussed, certain divestitures and other remedies will remain
possible. In addition, the fear of monetary sanctions and
other corrective actions can serve to deter anticompetitive
behavior by merged firms and anticompetitive mergers.
Third, the post-merger review raises a potential “false positive” error cost concern. The review might erroneously
attribute adverse competitive effects to the merger and would
lead the court to order additional relief. If this is a significant
possibility, the fear of such erroneous remedies might deter
the merged firm from engaging in certain procompetitive
conduct.31
However, this concern about over-deterrence comes with
several significant caveats. For one thing, it is well known in
the law and economics literature that both false positive and
false negative errors tend to lead to under-deterrence, not
over-deterrence.32 In addition, there is less (if any) over-deterrence concern for certain types of conduct. For example,
suppose that the merged firm is concerned that it will face the
prospect of additional relief if it leads or follows consciously
parallel, oligopolistic price increases after the merger. (While
such oligopoly pricing does not violate Section 1, a merger
that facilitates more successful oligopoly pricing can violate
Section 7.) That deterrence actually would increase consumer
welfare. Moreover, deterring oligopolistic price increases that
would have occurred even absent the merger would not cause
social harm. The same consumer benefits would accrue to
price increases forgone in response to demand increases when
prices initially are supracompetitive and variable costs are
constant.
Price increases also could have been caused by changes in
demand or costs or other exogenous supply factors not related to the merger. The merged firm may fear that this conduct
might be falsely criticized as the exercise of harmful market
power flowing from the merger. Similarly, the merged firm
contemplating a quality increase that would raise nominal
prices, while reducing quality-adjusted prices, might fear that
the agency would undervalue or even ignore the quality
increase, and thereby treat the conduct as an exercise of market power.
This source of error and over-deterrence does raise a caution. It means that the agencies will need to take care in carrying out their reviews. It is not enough simply to evaluate the
change in nominal prices since the merger. The agency must
evaluate quality-adjusted prices as well as nominal price

increases and the resulting impact on output. The agency
similarly must determine the prices relative to those that
would have occurred absent the merger. However, this type
of comparison is within the competence of the agencies and
the courts to evaluate. It therefore does not seem like a sufficient reason to give the firm a free pass after settling the case
with a consent decree.
Finally, this latter discussion might lead to a criticism that
the proposal is demanding a zero failure rate for merger consent decrees. That is not the case. While the agencies certainly
should strive for perfection, that outcome is not possible in
an uncertain world, even with this modification process. The
modification process will face the remedial constraints
detailed here, as well as informational constraints. Instead, the
goal and benefits of the proposal are to lead to improved outcomes and deterrence. In addition, by reviewing the efficacy
of consent decrees in this process, it is likely that the design
of future consent decrees also can be improved. While this
will be more work for the agencies, that extra work is necessary. Leaving in place flawed consent decrees harms consumers and competition and compromises the integrity and
public perception of the merger enforcement process.
Conclusion
Legislation is not required to adopt this review and modification proposal. All that is required is a will by the agencies
to improve merger enforcement policy. For a merger settled
by consent decree, the agencies can insist on including a
review and modification provision in the consent decrees. In
a case in which the merging parties “litigate the fix” in court
and prevail, it also would be natural for the court to include
a review and modification provision in its order.
However the policy is implemented, using review and
modification provisions in merger enforcement makes economic sense. As emphasized above, consumers currently bear
the entire downside risk. Merging firms have little incentive
to avoid over-reaching claims during the HSR review. The use
of post-merger reviews and consent decree modification provisions can mitigate these concerns. Asking the merging firms
to “put their money where their mouth is” can both partially insure consumers against the downside risk and facilitate
a more efficient merger enforcement process.䡵
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